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By Louis Rene Beres January,
2001
The term "correlation of forces" is a useful concept of military
strategy. Widely used by the former Soviet Union, it is applied as a measure
of armed forces, from the subunit level to major formations. Additionally,
it has been used to compare resources and capabilities on both the levels
of military strategy and of so-called "grand strategy." This
meaning is closely related to the concept of "force ratios"
used in the West.
Today, with the winds of war blowing again in the Middle East, Israel
must undertake productive assessments of enemy states with particular
reference to "correlation of forces." Here it must seek more
than an "objective" yardstick for measurement of opposing forces.
Although the IDF is assuredly comparing all available data concerning
both the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of units, including
personnel, weaponry and equipment, its commanders will need to know more
to establish Israeli force superiority at decisive places and times. This
is especially the case in matters of grand strategy, where opposing forces
are endowed with weapons of mass destruction.
What, exactly, must be the IDF concept of "correlation of forces?"
First, it must take careful account of enemy leaders' intentions as well
as capabilities. Such an accounting is inherently more subjective than
assessments of personnel, weapons and basic logistic data. Such an accounting
must be subtle and nuanced, relying less on scientific modeling than upon
carefully informed profiles. In this connection, it will not due to merely
gather relevant data from all of the usual sources. It will also be important
to put themselves into the shoes of each enemy leader, determining what
Israel looks like TO THEM.
Second, the IDF correlation of forces concept must take account of enemy
leaders' rationality. An adversary that does not conform to the rules
of rational behavior in world politics might not be deterred by ANY Israeli
threats, military or otherwise. Here the logic of deterrence would be
immobilized and all bets would be off concerning expected enemy reactions
to Israeli policy.
Third, IDF assessments must also consider the organization of enemy state
units; their training standards; their morale; their reconnaissance capabilities;
their battle experience; and their suitability and adaptability to the
prospective battlefield. These assessments are not exceedingly difficult
to make on an individual or piecemeal basis, but the IDF needs to conceptualize
them together, in their entirety. To get this more coherent picture will
require creativity and imagination, not merely mathematical skills.
Fourth, IDF assessments must consider the capabilities and intentions
of Israel's nonstate enemies; that is, the entire configuration of anti-Israel
terrorist groups. And once again, such assessments must offer more than
a group by group consideration. Rather, the groups must be considered
in their entirety, as they interrelate with one another vis-a-vis Israel.
And these groups need to be considered in their interactive relationship
with enemy states. This last point might best be characterized as an IDF
search for pertinent "synergies" between state and nonstate
adversaries.
Fifth, IDF assessments must take special note of the ongoing metamorphosis
of a nonstate adversary (PLO) into a state adversary (Palestine). With
this metamorphosis, Israel's strategic depth will soon shrink to barely
manageable levels, and a far-reaching enemy momentum to transform Israel
itself into part of the new Arab state will be energized. How shall Israel
"live" with Palestine? This shall be an absolutely critical
question for strategists and scholars.
In the matter of synergies, the IDF must also consider and look for "force
multipliers." A force multiplier is a collection of related characteristics,
other than weapons and force size, that make a military organization more
effective in combat. A force multiplier may be generalship; tactical surprise;
tactical mobility; command and control system; etc. The presence of a
force multiplier CREATES synergy. The unit will be more effective than
the mere sum of its weapons. IDF responsibility in this area concerns
(1) recognizing enemy force multipliers; (2) challenging and undermining
enemy force multipliers; and (3) developing and refining its own force
multipliers. Regarding number (3), this means a heavy IDF emphasis on
air superiority; communications; intelligence; and surprise.
Correlation of forces will essentially determine the outcome of the coming
catastrophic war. It is time for Israel to go well beyond the usual numerical
assessments to "softer" considerations, and to focus especially
upon the cumulative importance of unconventional weapons and strategies
in the region.
 
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