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Do good fences
really make good neighbors? By Reuven Koret August 20, 2001 It has become fashionable, following the collapse of the diplomatic process and the sharp rise in Palestinian violence, for Israelis and their overseas supporters to consider unilateral separation as a last resort to sharply reduce terror attacks and bring about a live-and-let-live situation. The idea, to quote the words of the less-than-sympathetic neighborly figure in Frost's "The Mending Wall" is that "good fences make good neighbors." This was the solution proposed by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak after his peace initiatives were spurned and before his drubbing in the last election. It has been raised after each spate of suicide attacks. The idea is resurrected now largely by politicians and academics associated with the left side of the Israeli political spectrum, but there are supporters for the idea in the center and the right as well. The phrase "unilateral separation" is used to cover a multitude of uncertainties. The basic idea is that Israel will decide for itself what its borders with the Palestinians should be, and there will build a fence, preferably high and electrified, to separate us from them. Indeed, unilateral separation has a strong resonance with unilateral withdrawal, which Barak hurriedly implemented in Lebanon when his hopes for a negotiated settlement fell through. That withdrawal, made before a border fence was even completed, reduced casualties of Israeli soldiers and Katyusha attacks. But it led to kidnappings across the fence-less frontier and drew Hizbullah terrorists, and their missiles, to the edge of Israel's northern border, its so-called "good fence" as it was known once upon a time, when there was quiet cooperation and humanitarian exchanges between Israelis and Lebanese. Frost's skeptical comment to his pro-fence neighbor asks the right question: Before I built a wall I'd ask to know When one starts asking questions like these, sharp differences between left and right emerge. Leftists see Israel building a fence on or near the 1967 "green line," forcing residents of settlements to either come to our side of the line or be abandoned on the other side. Many see the call for unilateral separation as temporary, tactical, stopgap palliative until the peace process can resume and an agreed two-state solution can be achieved. Rightists see Israel annexing large tracts of territory, including the Jordan valley, areas north and south of Jerusalem, the area around Ariel protecting the narrow Israeli waist, and the high ground controlling critical water supplies and mountain passes; they envision expelling Palestinian militants from villages that fall on the Israeli side of the new lines, leaving the Palestinian Authority with some disconnected cantons. While they may contemplate evacuating some isolated settlements, this would be tolerated only in the content of strengthening and affirming permanent settlement blocs. There is perhaps a middle ground with boundaries reflecting the broad Israeli consensus. The Allon Plan, advanced by a popular Israeli general and statesman in the 1970's, was for many years the preferred diplomatic blueprint of the Labor Party. Allon's principle was that Palestinian population centers would be handed over, but strategic locations would be retained. Barak's formulation at Camp David (in which 80% of Jewish settlers reportedly would find themselves on the Israeli side of the proposed borders) was based on this principle, although it was significantly sweetened to entice Palestinian acceptance, proposing to cede at least 90% of the West Bank. After the Palestinian rejection and subsequent violence, the Israeli left would probably settle for the Barak formulation, while the right may believe that the Allon Plan represents the best possible borders they can achieve. Thus the "pragmatic" Israeli internal debate may fall somewhere between the Allon lines and the Barak lines. Still, there is a clear and pragmatic answer to Frost's question on one point: unilateral separation would "give offence" to just about everyone. The Arabs wouldn't accept it, the United States and Europe wouldn't accept it, and most Israelis would not accept it either as they attempt to translate the desired concept -"us here, them there"-into practice. Among the problems, each of which is a potential deal-breaker:
If all of these problems would be miraculously overcome, and a separating fence is built, where will that leave us? With peace? With security? And what will Israel do if, after unilateral separation, Arab stoning, and sniping, and suicide bombs continue? Build another wall around Israeli Arab villages? Around Jaffa? Around Jerusalem? No advocate of unilateral separation asks or answers these questions. No fence, ultimately, will separate Israel forever from the hatred of our neighbors, and no Israeli concession short of suicide will satisfy many of those who campaign against our existence. On the contrary, they would likely perceive an Israel retreat behind newly constructed, constricted borders, abandoning settlements and settlers, as a great victory, a Lebanon-like forced retreat, incontrovertible proof of the efficacy of violence and terror. The Arabs would persist in their campaign, leveraging the world's dissatisfaction with Israel's unilateral moves, to push for dismantling of that fence, introducing "supervisors" to implement the UN sanctioned partition of Palestine according to the 1947 lines, and forcing us to accept the "right of return" of their refugees. From there it would take just one more push for the Palestinians to realize the dream of a unified democratic state between river and sea, one which need not include either fences, or Jews-or, perhaps, Jews within fences. I think fair-minded observers would agree that, for the most part, Israel has tried to be a good neighbor, to extend its friendship to former adversaries. After decades of national policy based on building what Jabotinsky presciently described as an iron wall, our leaders began taking calculated risks for peace. The risks increased, as did the breaches in our defenses. Peace with relatively faraway Egypt, with the Sinai Desert as buffer, was one thing. But Oslo opened up the gates, inviting in the PLO to take control, giving them territory, authority, and thousands of weapons, safe havens, and factories to make mortars and suicide bombs, and no effective borders to protect us. The Palestinians had many opportunities for a peaceful solution, most recently a generous peace proposal with potentially worldwide support-and they responded with unceasing violence in pursuit of a maximal solution. Their goal, increasingly undisguised, is the dismantling of the Jewish State, to be realized, to judge by their actions in the past ten months, by killing as many Jews as possible. Arafat and his PLO have a track record of destabilizing their neighborhood by deceit, subversion, corruption, and armed force: first, in Jordan, from which they were expelled in September 1970; then, in Lebanon, from which they were expelled in 1982. A Nobel Prize, hugs and kisses, and red-carpet treatment changed neither strategy nor tactics. The poet, ultimately, saw in the wall-building neighbor something of a mortal threat: I see him there, Confronting stone-age savagery and modern-day weaponry, Israel must avoid fencing itself in, or limiting its freedom of diplomatic and military action. If the cruelty of our enemies forces us in the end to rebuild a wall, they should know-and the world should know-it will be a wall built without our enthusiasm, and without our mercy. And it will not be a wall that prevents us from reaching over it to preempt the attacks of our enemies. Arab aggression, in 1948 and 1967, led to Arab destitution, defeat, flight, and expulsion. Then, too, their leaders and preachers promised them that violence would lead to the end of Israel and the departure of its Jews. So they tell them today. But stones, snipers, and suicide bombs will yield no more, and no less, than they ever did. Those who preach Israel's destruction and Jewish dispersion should know that they are playing with fire. The people of Israel-those who live here and those who support us from outside-are a human Wall. When push comes to shove, we will stand as solid as the Western one surrounding and symbolizing the Temple to which our ancestors have prayed these thousands of years. From left and from right, we will close ranks and lock arms. We are back. We will never leave. If the Arabs think they can scare us away, or drive us away, they will find a wall all right, an iron wall we will, with sadness and regret, and pangs of conscience, be forced by their vicious unceasing hatred to rebuild, insurmountably. The "good neighbors" of Israel should know this: when the convulsive fighting is over, the fog of war lifts, and the casualties are grimly counted, they may find themselves-again-on the outside of the "good fence," unable even to look back in, let alone enter.
Views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.
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