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The bell that
tolls for Arafat By Avi Davis October 18, 2001 Until six weeks ago, it appeared that Yasser Arafat had bet the farm on the execution of the following strategy: Give tacit support to a low intensity war, led by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, that would target ordinary Israeli civilians. Ensure that casualties are significant enough to provoke harsh Israeli reprisals, images of which would then be broadcast worldwide as evidence of Israeli brutality. Once achieved, embark on an international campaign to hammer home the argument that without direct European and American intervention, another Kosovo was in the offing. The end result: Appeasement of hard line Palestinians and the beginnings of an internationally imposed solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Whatever realistic hopes Arafat entertained for the plan's realization, after September 11, it looked doomed. Following the bombings, Yasser Arafat could have expected to become a pariah again and his mini-terrorist state, the target of American ire. Instead, the Palestinians were, remarkably, among the first beneficiaries of the bombing. A disengaged Bush Administration suddenly awoke to the need to appease those Arab states furious at perceived U.S. bias towards Israel. Quick as one could whisper the word surrender, George Bush, who had previously not evinced the slightest interest in the Palestinian cause, endorsed the concept of a Palestinian state. If Arafat celebrated this fortuitous turn of events, his joy was almost certainly short-lived. In another fateful stab of irony, Arafat received two blows that have left him politically wounded and struggling to recover. The first was the rise of support in the Palestinian street for Osama Bin Laden, demonstrations that resulted in the killing of three Palestinians by Palestinian police in Gaza. The second was Osama Bin Laden's address to the Muslim world in which the terrorist mastermind implied that his campaign of terror was primarily focused on liberating Palestine. The Palestinians and the rest of the world now had direct confirmation that Bin Laden's war was expressly aimed at U.S policy toward Israel. In Gaza, it suddenly became apparent that it was the apocalyptic Bin Laden who was the great symbol of Palestinian resolve, not the Palestinian Authority's own kow-towing Chairman. The deaths in Gaza and Bin Laden's surprise video have stripped away the façade that has shielded Arafat from both international and internal Palestinian scrutiny. Faced with incontrovertible evidence of anti-American sentiment on the Palestinian street and the continued perpetration of terror against Israeli targets, the Americans will expect Arafat in the coming weeks to provide proof of his pro-American credentials. On the other hand, Palestinian radicals will expect him to resist this pressure and recognize Bin Laden's war as their own. If he cannot or will not crack down on Palestinian extremists, he runs the risk of once again being branded an international outcast. If he does not accede to the radicals' demands, he faces threats to his own life. The invidious dilemma in which Arafat finds himself drips with the residue of the Faustian bargain he made years ago with terrorist organizations. Since his return to Gaza in 1994, he has coddled the radicals in his midst, insisting to the West that their fury (as expressed in acts of terrorism) could not be controlled, while quietly striking deals with each of them behind the scenes. But while his dilemma gives Arafat very little room for maneuver, it should also offer him some clarity. The opportunity to finally disavow terrorism and turn to nation building is within his reach. Whether he has the tenacity to do that will become the ultimate test of his courage. For the United States, on the other hand, this is not a time to take pity on the beleaguered Palestinian leader. With 60,000 well-trained men under arms and his own capable intelligence network, it would be foolish for the U.S. to continue to accept his assertions of impotence. It is time for the U.S to make clear to Arafat that continued cooperation with terrorists and failure to honor commitments he made years ago to the Israelis, can only result in his abandonment and thereafter a free hand to the Israelis to deal with him as they consider appropriate. Western commitment to a war against terrorism should make clear to everyone in the Middle East that terrorism is not a legitimate expression of national aims. Around the world, the death knell may soon peal for those remaining committed to violence. But in Yasser Arafat's case at least, it should be understood that the bell that tolls, will have a resolute United States yanking on the bell rope. Views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.
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